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In the paper we study the recursive nature of artifacts in the production and the 
socialization of organizational knowledge. In this respect, artifacts are interpreted both 
as the product (output) of organizational knowledge processes and, at the same time, as 
tools easing the development of other artifacts. We compare different practices of 
knowledge creation and diffusion in complex software production processes with the 
aim of understanding the effects of interplay between (1) coordination and control 
practices, (2) mediating artifacts and development tools, and (3) interactions between 
different actors in the development process. We aim at identifying the peculiar traits 
emerging in contrasting development paradigms, namely the closed, fully proprietary 
one widespread in the gaming console industry, and the open model of free/open source 
software development. 
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In  this  paper  we  study  the  recursive  nature  of  artifacts  in  the  production  and  the 
socialization of organizational knowledge. In this respect, artifacts are interpreted both 
as the product (output) of organizational knowledge processes and, at the same time, as 
tools to ease the development of further knowledge. 
Specifically, in this paper we compare different practices of knowledge creation and 
diffusion in complex software production processes with the aim of understanding the 
effects of the often neglected interplay between 1) coordination and control practices, 2) 
mediating artifacts and development tools, and 3) interactions between different actors 
in  the  development  process.  In  particular,  we  aim  at  identifying  the  peculiar  traits 
emerging in contrasting development paradigms, namely the closed, proprietary model, 
which is widespread in the gaming console industry, and the Free/Open Source software 
development.  Comparisons  between  proprietary  and  F/OSS  software  development 
processes are, oftentimes, characterized in terms of the relationship between property 
rights, revenue distribution and power within a network of actors.  
We  believe  that  by  extending  this  comparison  to  include  1)  knowledge  exchanges 
between  the  relevant  actors,  2)  the  different  strategies  they  employ  to  overcome 
asymmetries  in  information  and  knowledge,  and  3)  the  relevant  tools  they  adopt  to 
implement these strategies, we can further the lively debate animating organizational 
literature  on  the  dual  nature  of  artifacts,  stressing  the  importance  of  the  interplay 
between  their  technical  features  and  the  normative  meanings  they  can  assume. 
Moreover, our contribution can help shed some light on recent developments in the 
video gaming industry, which is moving from a proprietary structure in the software 
development tools to the provision of open technologies.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we briefly outline the main contributions 
on  the  recursive  nature  of  organizational  production  of  artifacts,  focusing  on  the 
structuring role of artifacts with respect to the organizational structure. In section 2 we 
propose a reinterpretation of the role of artifacts as mediating instruments for indirectly 
regulating inter-organizational relationships characterized by differing degrees of one 
part’s control over the production process. In section 3 we give a brief account of our 
methodological choices. In section 4, we outline the first case, taken from an industry 
characterized by a strict proprietary control, namely the development of a videogame   2 
software for consoles. We will show how the control in the production of intermediate 
artifacts  helps  one  of  the  firms  involved  to  regulate  the  work  of  the  downstream 
development process by means of imposing the use of certain “intermediate” tools. This 
control  structure  partly  substitutes  and  partly  integrates  the  more  traditional  control 
process,  typically  based  on  contracts  and  observation  of  practices.  In  section  5  we 
present  the  case  of  a  software  project  developed  from  a  F/OSS  community, 
characterized by a fuzzier definition of borders between the roles of individual actors in 
the development process, and the rights and control they have over the code. Finally, in 
section 6 we compare and discuss the two cases, suggesting possible paths along the 
way of a hybridization process that seems to be emerging in the practices of some of the 
major players in the video-game industry. 
 
1. The organizational role of artifacts: contrasting deterministic and structuring 
approaches 
 
The first step in our analysis consisted in a review of the main approaches attempting to 
explain  the  role  that  artifacts  can  play  in  fostering  and  developing  organizational 
capabilities. There are two different reasons that compelled us to devote our attention 
exclusively  to  Information  Technology  artifacts.  On  the  one  hand,  obviously,  they 
represent the prevailing type of artifacts that are employed in the software development 
industry, which is the focus of our paper. On the other hand, Information Technology 
artifacts are ubiquitous, both in the social and in the organizational environments.  
After many years of research in this field, it is becoming clear that using deterministic 
approaches,  originally  developed  to  study  the  impact  of  non  information-related 
technologies on organizations, is not very fruitful. Several authors have clearly shown 
that empirical findings are very ambiguous and contradictory (Robey 1977, Attewell 
and  Rule  1984,  Fulk  and  DeSanctis  1995,  Robey  and  Boudreau  1999).  Deep  and 
numerous contradictions occur not only across studies, but also within studies, and most 
of them cannot be solved with just a refinement of the research methodologies, but they 
call  for  a  deep  rethinking  of  the  theoretical  approaches  and  the  analytical  models. 
Several  researchers  have  proposed  to  use  new  and  more  complex frameworks,  new 
concepts and new research methods (Barley, 1986, 1990; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991;   3 
Orlikowski,  1992;  DeSanctis  &  Poole  1994;  Sahay  1997;  Griffith,  1999).  While  all 
these proposals offer new and very interesting insights, we argue that a crucial point 
needs to be made: artifacts should not be considered as “external shocks” impacting on 
organizations in complex ways, but as structuring devices and, at the same time, as 
outcomes of the organizational processes themselves. 
For these reasons, we chose to regard artifacts as negotiated, and embedded sets of rules 
for goal oriented action (Norman, 1991, 1993). Their organizational role is shaped by 
the same goal oriented activities for which they are conceived, implemented, and used. 
Our  conceptual  approach  of  artifact  is,  thus,  similar  to  the  concept  of  ‘instrument’ 
proposed by Rabardel (1995), where acceptance by the user plays a key role in defining 
actual behavior (Davis et al., 1989): only the actor’s intention in the use of a tool can 
give it the quality of artifact. As a portion of the rules that inform organized action, the 
artifact is relevant at the organizational level as a means of regulation for distributed 
(Engestrøm, 1991) and situated (Suchman, 1987) activities.  
We believe that our approach can be especially fruitful for the analysis of Information 
Technology artifacts, and in particular for the analysis of software-based, or ‘logical’ 
artifacts. The obvious way to describe software artifacts is, in fact, to define them as sets 
of rules that, on the one hand, are executed by a machine, and, on the other hand, have a 
regulatory impact on work activities. 
 
2. Why are artifacts relevant from an organizational standpoint? 
 
We can define artifacts as a visible translation of the knowledge developed within and 
outside  organizations.  They  are  a  sort  of  crystallization  of  effective  solutions  to 
recurrent problems: developing and using artifacts that embed these solutions allows the 
sharing of these ‘filtered’ forms of experience. 
In  turn,  artifacts  are  devices  that  can  have  a  decisive  role  in  the  processes  of 
structuration of the organizational action. Mainly, this role is due to their cognitive 
value. 
Norman (1991, 1993) observes that the items he calls ‘cognitive artifacts’ have two 
purposes.   4 
First, they support the use of scarce cognitive resources in various ways, and they can 
guide the representation of relevant knowledge in order to better define and shape the 
problem to be solved. As an example, we can think of the checklists we use before 
going to a grocery store, or the ones we use to simplify the packing process before a 
long  trip:  these  lists  are  simple  artifacts  conceived  and  built  with  the  purpose  of 
focusing  our  attention  in  a  complex  or  stressful  situation.  In  a  problem-solving 
perspective,  the  artifact  embeds  information  that  is  useful  to  decompose  a  complex 
problem into an ordered set of sub-goals: solving all the sub-goals allows, in turn, to 
solve the complex problem that was set at the beginning. 
Second,  artifacts  have  an  important  social  meaning  as  they  represent  receptacles  of 
common experience which is shared within the group that conceives, builds and uses 
them  (Hutchins,  1991,  1995).  Artifacts  are,  at  the  same  time,  part  of  a  shared 
organizational language and a tangible expression of the organizational values. 
Organizations, then, just like individuals, build artifacts with the goal of structuring 
actions. In fact the artifact itself is often meant as a device to influence and shape, in 
different ways, individual and group decisions and actions. 
Moreover, the introduction of artifacts that were designed to help solving a particular 
problem can, in fact, produce a new kind of problem for the user. He or she needs to be 
able to ‘read’ and verify the domain of application for the artifact. As an example we 
can hypothesize the introduction of a standard  operating procedure (SOP). An SOP 
changes in a profound way the nature of the problems an actor is supposed to solve. The 
actor needs to be able to analyze the situation, in order to understand if the criteria to 
apply  the  procedure  are  met.  Once  the  actor  has  taken  the  decision  to  activate  the 
procedure, the SOP can structure the action in a very precise way, and the actor will not 
have to take a whole set of decisions that used to be a part of his/her representation of 
the situation before the adoption of the SOP. 
To  summarize,  if  artifacts  are  conceived  as  sets  of  negotiated,  sedimented  and 
embedded rules, their organizational relevance can take many different shapes, that are 
not always present at the same time, and that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
First, artifacts can be a means to improve rationality, whether it is individual, collective 
or organizational: as sets of rules, they can modify the representation of problems, they   5 
can further the transmission of knowledge and information, and they can make explicit a 
set of shared symbolic values. 
Second,  artifacts  can  be,  as  well,  a  direct  or  indirect  means  of  regulation  and 
structuration of the organizational action (providing rules and resources), with results 
that can vary considerably, in form and content. 
 
IT artifacts and organizational decisions 
Our  interpretive  framework  is  based  on  the  concept  of  bounded  rationality  (Simon, 
1947; March and Simon, 1958). The concepts of choice and decision process that we are 
using imply all those informational, social and cognitive limitations and biases that are 
included in Simon’s approach. 
We  consider  organizational  structuring  as  the  collective  outcome  of  a  complex  and 
dynamic  set  of  interactions  between  different,  bounded  rational  decision  processes, 
enacted by individuals and/or collective actors. 
IT artifacts have an important role for organizational structuring. This importance can 
be better understood if we consider three analytical sets of decision processes related to 
the presence of artifacts in organizations: design, adoption and use decisions. In the 
remaining  sections  of  the  paper  we  employ  an  analytical  framework  we  presented 
elsewhere (Masino and Zamarian, 2003) to describe the role of Information Technology 
artifacts for the regulation of work activities related to the development of complex 
video-game software products, stressing the recursive nature of the process generating 
the  artifact  itself,  and  the  interplay  between  relational  and  technical  features  of  the 
technologies involved. 
 
3. Method and data collection 
 
Coherently  with  the  exploratory  nature  of  this  stage  of  the research,  we  decided  to 
proceed in an inductive way starting from a set of interviews and the collection of 
secondary sources with the key actors in the product design and production processes of 
two technology leaders operating in the video-game development industry. Since we 
were trying to improve our understanding of the phenomenon we deemed necessary to 
use  a  method  that  enabled  us  to  capture  the  dynamics  of  the  processes  we  were 
observing and to provide a detailed description of the phenomena themselves.   6 
Within these constraints we decided to introduce some degree of inter firm variability 
in some key aspects, namely the proprietary structure of rights on software products, in 
order to refine our understanding of the investigated phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin 
1984),  as  we  will  see  in  some  detail  in  the  sections  describing  the  projects  in  our 
sample. 
We chose projects as our unit of analysis. There are two main reasons for this choice, 
given  our  goal  of  exploring  the  meanings  and  the  importance  of  the  relationship 
between  property  rights  and  “power”  considerations,  on  one  hand,  and  competence 
related problems on the other. In the first place, the focus on projects allows the joint 
analysis of the stage of design and development of an innovation with the stage of the 
actual  implementation.  Secondly,  given  the  strongly  asymmetric  features  of  players 
operating in the very proprietary and closed world of console game development, versus 
the F/OSS environment, it would have been difficult to properly define the concept of 
“firm” or even “development team” in the second case. Of course, we felt the need to 
guarantee some degree of comparability between projects. As these software projects, 
by design, need to work on very heterogeneous platforms, we decided that complexity 
measures directly linked to logical features of the software, such as lines of code, were 
uninformative. On a different level, trying to measure the dimension of the projects in 
terms of sheer number of people involved also seems wrong, because we can safely 
presume  different  levels  of  involvement  between  employees  in  a  software  firm  and 
volunteer developers in a F/OSS project.   
We conducted our first interviews with the project leaders of the two most recent 
research project in which the two firms were involved in order to be able to fully exploit 
the memories of the involved actors, along with and archival data. Starting from the 
concepts and ideas that emerged during the pilot interviews we proceeded to expand the 
set of people interviewed, in order to include most of the people who actually took part 
in the design and development of the product. 
 
 
4. Proprietary game development in the console industry 
 
The typical development process for a console video game can be characterized as in 




FIGURE 1: Actor’s relationships in the video game industry for consoles. 
Source: Adapted from Johns, 2006. 
 
Essentially the console producer has two main sources of games for its product. On the 
one hand it can use internal resources both to design the game (i.e. development teams) 
and  to  publish  it.  On  the  other,  external  developers,  approved  by  the  console 
manufacturer by means of a preliminary screening process, can submit project ideas 
either to internal (to the console producer) or independent publishers. Publishers, in 
turn, will decide on the marketability of the proposal and, as a consequence, either to   8 
finance or to kill the project. If given approval, the developer produces the game code 
and releases it to the publisher. At this point the publisher sends the code to the console 
manufacturer which does two things. First it gives final approval of the software project 
as a whole after one more round of drive-testing of the code, as in the console market 
the game needs to be released with zero-defect quality as a goal. The practice, common 
in the PC games market, of a rushed release that is patched with remote upgrades by the 
end-user, has not been feasible up to the current generation of consoles. Then, if the 
release  is  accepted,  the  console  manufacturer  takes  care  of  the  production  of  the 
physical copies (usually on CD or DVD support) of the game. In turn, the manufacturer 
releases the copies of the game back to the publisher (again, this can be either internal 
or  independent)  that  manages  the  downstream  relationships  with  distributors  and 
retailers.  
The complex interplay between these actors is usually described in terms of two kinds 
of exchanges. On the one hand we have direct monitoring on the output of each phase. 
The extent o this form of control is linked to the negotiating power of partners, and it 
finds its natural expression in contracts and legal agreements. The second exchange 
consists in the financial flows between the involved parties. The interplay between these 
two kinds of relationships is, thus, coherent with the traditional view of transaction costs 
economics, and the same explanation applies to the tendency of vertical integration 
driven either by console manufacturers and large publishers. 
With  this  perspective  in  mind  it  appears  obvious  that  developers  are  described  as 
marginal actors in the network of interdependencies that ultimately generate the end 
product  (Johns,  2006),  as  they  are  completely  dependent  on  both  the  console 
manufacturers and the (usually much larger) publishers. However, this picture does not 
capture one of the essential ingredients of developing a successful piece of gaming 
software, that is, the ability of the network to tap strongly asymmetric sources of ideas, 
creativity,  and  technical  coding  expertise.  If  we  look  at  this  side  of  the  issue,  we 
discover a few layers of complexity that can hardly be considered secondary to explain 
the whole process. 
In fact, we believe that the often neglected part of the network encompassing the social 
role of development tools and middleware as both control tools and boundary objects   9 
(Yin, 2005) between idiosyncratic domains of knowledge and ideas is key to understand 
the phenomenon. 
In order to do this, in the next section we will take a closer look at the development 
process in the ultra proprietary domain that characterizes the console market.   
 
Developing games in the proprietary arena: the Milestone case 
Milestone is a small multi-platform game developer based in Milan. Born in 1996 as a 
developer for PC games, it now employs around 40 people, including programmers, 
artists and producers in just one, fairly large, development team and minimal managerial 
staff. Milestone moved into the console arena in 2001 with titles for Microsoft Xbox,  
Sony’s Playstation2, and Nintendo Gamecube. When compared to the standard process 
we described in the previous section, Milestone has two main characteristics that are 
relevant  for  our  discussion.  On  the  hand,  it  is  a  genre  specific,  niche  developer 
specializing in racing games, a specialization that dates back to the very foundation of 
the firm. On the other hand, it entered the console market during the second wave of 
entries for the seventh generation, 128-bit consoles. 
These two features have had clear implications in the way Milestone started developing 
its projects for the console world, in terms of knowledge domain of the development 
team, project management (i.e. make or buy decisions with respect to the final code 
production), development tools used, and, of course relationships with other relevant 
actors in the value chain. In the following subsections we will take a close look at these 
aspects of the game development operations, starting with a general description of the 
code-generating process.  
 
Game development at Milestone 
Because of its history of early success in developing a racing game which owned its 
success primarily on how it modeled the physics of motorcycles and on its graphics, 
Milestone  decided  to  keep  developing  games  based  on  these  same  two  core 
components, changing, from time to time only the peripheral aspects of the code. This is 
the essential reason why, at least in Milestone’s case, it does not make sense to use the 
individual title as focus of analysis, but rather the development team itself. Moreover, 
and this is more of a general comment on how, historically, they decided to produce   10 
software, Milestone started from a situation in which the components of each game 
were tightly coupled and moved towards a modular design for each game, with two core 
modules, several peripheral components and an outer layer of software devoting to the 
porting (or adaptation) of software into the individual hardware platforms. 
In  this  regard  we  can  look  at  the  different  generations  of  gaming  code  as  a  set  of 
incremental innovations on the core components. The first component, in the jargon of 
the developers we interviewed the “physics engine”, can be considered the real core of 
the  game.  Essentially,  it  models  how  moving  objects  behave  in  relation  with  other 
objects, trying to fulfill two distinct requirements: to mimic, at least to some extent, real 
world physics, giving the right sensations to the player; to avoid introducing too much 
complexity in the interplay between user interface and the modeled physics, in order to 
avoid  frustration  and  to  keep  the  game  playable.  This  piece  of  software,  and  in 
particular the fine balance between realism and playability, according to the developers 
themselves, is the key to explain the commercial success of the games: in fact, this core 
component has not evolved much since its first release in 1996, and its development has 
always been carried out by a group within the development team. The graphics engine is 
the second major component of the core. This component takes care of the generation of 
3-D models representing bikes, cars, tracks and their features. Albeit being as central as 
the physics engine, and thus being developed completely in-house, the development of 
the graphics component has one major difference with the former. Namely, the graphics 
engine goes through a continuous process of innovation, in order to incorporate and 
exploit the new features of each generation of hardware (this works both for PC and 
console).  For  each  major  step  forward  of  the  available  commercial  hardware,  the 
graphics engine is reworked in order to make it capable of fully exploiting the least 
performing platform available, with extra add-ons and adaptations for better performing 
machines.  
On a second layer with respect to the two core components, each game is completed 
with  at  least  four  other  modules.  The  most  critical  ones  are  the  rendering  engine, 
providing the algorithms to generate, in real time, the textures for the surfaces of the 
moving  objects  in  the  game,  the  sounds  component,  letting  “events”  in  the  game 
generate appropriate effects, the module managing the user generated input (typically 
coming from joysticks on PCs, and similar peripheries for the consoles), and the module   11 
regulating the behavior of the computer controlled “players”(AI module). All of these 
second layer components are produced by Milestone by recurring heavily to third party 
software  development  tools.  These  tools  provide  two  kinds  of  services.  First,  they 
effortlessly allow for the porting process from the high level code, typically produced 
by the creative artists within the development team, into the specific, compiled code that 
can  be  run  by  any  hardware  combination.  Second,  they  allow  the  developers  to 
concentrate on the internal mechanics of the software they are producing, with no need 
to invest energies in researching the specific hardware architectures of each platform. 
The  importance  of  these  intermediate  tools  in  the  development  process  cannot  be 
overstated: according to the developers trying to interact directly with the development 
libraries provided by the console manufacturer has several shortcomings, especially for 
smaller developers, such as Milestone. We can broadly categorize these problems into 
two  main  classes.  On  the  one  hand  we  have  problems  related  with  the  different 
knowledge  domains  that  the  parties  control.  The  distance  between  competences  is 
particularly  relevant  in  the  case  of  graphic  artists  (usually  part  of  the  peripheral 
development  team)  and  the  manufacturers  hard-coders  that  produce  the  low-level 
libraries that are provided with the development kit. This gap, typically, can not be 
filled  by  most  small  developers,  hence  the  decisive  importance  of  the  middleware 
producers. 
Technically savvy developers, such as Milestone, on the other hand, can overcome the 
problem and build in-house the intermediate layers of software necessary to resolve the 
interdependences. This solution has the definite advantage of allowing for a better fine 
tuning  of  software  components,  thus,  generally  speaking,  generating  a  better 
performance.  However  there  are  at  least  two  decisive  drawbacks  associated  to  the 
internal development strategy. First, and more general, there are costs considerations: 
incorporating  the  physical  characteristics  of  a  given  hardware  architecture  into  the 
software development phase, is a long process absorbing many skilled resources. This 
sort of investment makes financial and operative sense only if the low level software 
can be developed at the very start of a new console’s life, so that it can be amortized by 
re-using the libraries themselves for the whole length of the console’s life. Moreover, 
devoting time and skills to develop architecture specific outer layers of the software can 
bring about a certain degree of loss of focus in the development team.    12 
In the particular case of Milestone, as they entered the console arena in 2001, when both 
Sony’s Playstation2 ™ and Microsoft’s Xbox™ had been around for about a year, they 
decided that the investment to produce the rendering module and the low-level interface 
with  the  development  software  supplied  by  the  manufacturers  were  not  financially 
sound. They ended up buying the software from the middleware producer Criterion, 
which  was  at  the  time  the  developer  of  Renderware™,  the  de  facto  standard  for 
rendering engines at the time. Faced with the same decision for the next generation of 
consoles, Milestone went with a “make” solution to face the same problem. The first 
reason  they  gave,  is,  once  again,  the  prospect  of  being  able  to  recoup  the  initial 
investment exploiting the code over the whole life-cycle of the new consoles. However, 
a  second,  critical  reason,  is  that  Criterion  has  been  acquired  by  the  large  publisher 
Electronic Arts who chose vertical integration to both acquire an interesting knowledge 
base and, at the same time, to subtract a valuable resource to competitors. The other 
modules, albeit not as critical, share the same role in the development process, and go 
through the same screening process, that ends, typically, with a “buy” solution. An outer 
layer of software, with respect to these “other” modules, allows for a smooth interfacing 
between  the  software  actually  implementing  the  game  and  the  hardware  platform. 
Traditionally  console  manufacturers  provided  these  libraries  alongside  the  hardware 
part of the development kit. However, with the growing complexity of the consoles, 
third parties have now entered this market with products mediating between developer 
produced code and low level proprietary language of the available platforms.  
Once implemented by means of these specific tools for the specific platform, Milestone 
hands the completed project over to the manufacturers quality control team that, after 
vetting the project, gives the final approval.   
 
Artifact-producing  artifacts:  middleware  and  developing  tools.  As  we  have  seen, 
illustrating the game production process in Milestone, looking at the production of a 
complex  piece  of  software,  such  as  a  console  video  game,  as  the  product  of  an 
individual  team  of  developers  is  misleading.  In fact,  if  we  look  at  Figure  2,  which 
reproduces  the  relationships  between  the  different  software  objects  involved  in  the 
production of the final release of the software, it is clear that we can distinguish at least 
four, hierarchically defined layers of tool.   13 
 
 
FIGURE  2:  Relations  between  software  components  in  Milestone’s  development 
process of a racing game. 
 
In the first layer we have the core components, produced completely in-house and in 
such a way that they require additional levels of software to become platform specific. 
On the second layer, we have four peripheral modules, still essential to the mechanics of 
the  game,  that  connect  to  the  core.  These  modules  have  been  produces  partly  by 
Milestone itself, partly by means of “off-the shelf utilities” available in the middleware 
market. Then, we have two sources of outer libraries and tools built to help make the 
code platform specific. Part of these tools is, again, third party, and part come directly 
from the console manufacturer. Apparently, thus, it seems that the level of control that 
the console manufacturer can exercise on the developer is strictly defined by either the 
(rather shallow) quality control processes taking place at the start and at the end of the 
development phase and, by the mediation of the libraries included in the development 
kits. However, middleware and development tools providers are not totally independent. 
In fact, they are selected by the console manufacturer with the same sort of procedure 

























for porting   14 
the manufacturers can actually subject the developers to. Of course, the end result still 
depends on the use decisions that the developer makes of these enabling technologies. 
 
The development network of agents 
From the network standpoint, Milestone behaves in a way that is pretty similar to the 
archetype  we  described  in  the  previous  section,  with  some  remarkable  differences, 
mainly  due  to  adoption  choices  of  artifacts,  used  as  boundary  spanners  between 
different knowledge domains. From the point of view of vertical relations in the value 
chain, Milestone has always been considered a top developer in the market, cooperating 
with  powerful  publishers,  such  as  Infogrames  (the  leading  European  publisher)  and 
Electronic  Arts,  building  these  critical  relationships  on  its  reputation  as  a  niche 
developer,  and  on  a  past  history  of  commercially  successful  productions.  These 
relationships work in a standard way, with respect to the general model. Milestone starts 
developing a game, as soon as a clear market opportunity in the form of a gap in the 
game catalogues of the major developers in the market. The project is then presented to 
prospective publishers who, in turn, decide to adopt and share the financial burden of 
the development. The console manufacturers, in time, included Milestone in the ranks 
of their “official” developers after a screening of the past history of the company. After 
this  official  endorsement,  the  manufacturer  provided  the  developing  kit  and  special 
testing machines, dubbed debugging machines, which can replicate the behavior of the 
actual, commercial console.  
Alongside  these  basic  devices,  Milestone  makes  use  of  a  wide  array  of  other 
development  tools  provided  for  by  third  parties,  the  middleware  producers.  These 
companies specialize in developing tools that can translate the high-level code typically 
produced by the creative artists into functioning, compiled pieces of code. Describing 
the code generation we outlined the different levels at which middleware producers 
enter in the production process. 
 
Heterogeneity  of  knowledge  domains  and  inter-firm  division  of  labour:  a  self-
reinforcing loop? 
As we have seen, room for independent development tools and middleware producers 
emerges either when a developer has not the technical expertise to develop the software   15 
itself,  or  when  it  does  not  believe  it  can  recoup  the  investment.  According  to  the 
developer we interviewed, the complexity of new generation consoles makes both these 
circumstances more probable. The upside, from the developer’s point of view, is the 
ability  to  concentrate  on  core  activities,  typically  creative  solutions  to  visualization 
problems  (both  physics  ad  graphics  in  the  case  at  hand)  or  storytelling  and  setting 
elements in other cases. The downside, of course, derives from relinquishing control to 
third parties of the implementation of these high levels ideas into working code. We 
need to underscore that, at least in principle, the more complex the new machines, and 
the faster the cycles of development for these platforms, the less a developer, even a 
competent one, will adopt a “make” strategy for its middleware. We believe that it is not 
far  fetched  to  hypothesize  a  progressive  loss  of  competence  on  the  translation 
mechanisms from the high level, descriptive languages typically used by creative artists 
into the lower level code required by the different platforms, if developers drop this 
practice altogether. On the other hand, middleware and development tools producers 
might  become  more  and  more  powerful  actors  in  the  value  chain,  if  this  trend  is 
confirmed.  
 
5. The development of computer games in the F/OSS community 
 
F/OSS connections with the gaming industry dates back at least to the mid-Nineties and 
are to be traced at least to two distinctive albeit intertwined trends: efforts undertaken by 
some  large  players  in  the  industry  in  leveraging  the  user–base  potential  in  the 
development  of  game  mods  and  the  emergence  of  user/developer  communities 
developing independent gaming projects.  
Regarding the former element, it has to be noted that it does exist in computer games a 
firm attitude by users to temper with the code  for enhancing and customizing their 
gaming  experience
1.  Later  on,  companies  such  as  id  Software  and  Epic  Games 
leveraged the potential of user communities by deliberately distributing software with 
liberal licensing terms (mandating the distribution of mods as open source software) and 
                                                 
1 For instance, Wolfenstein 3D (developed by id Software) gained popularity within the 
modder community since the map format had been reverse engineered, making it 
possible to edit existing game maps, thus customizing the game.   16 
by  support  their  user–base  through  the  development  of  specific  tools  to  ease  the 
modding process (Scacchi, 2001).  
This trend has been reinforced, in recent years, by the possibility, afforded by on-line 
gaming communities, to get more people involved in a coherent network of individuals 
sharing the same gamin interests. It is by means of this superficial involvement that 
most gamers can become “modders”, and, over time, outright developers. 
While  early  communities  revolved  under  projects  that  built  upon  large  proprietary 
software later released as open source (as in the case of the OS release of DOOM in 
1997), and involved the modification and development of F/OS variants of proprietary 
versions  of  games,  later  on,  the  emergence  of  independent  communities  of 
user/developers developing original games, has been more and more frequent. 
Computer game projects seems to be very popular among F/OS communities: as of June 
2006  the  Freshmeat.net  portal  has  3025  registered  projects  (out  of  40k),  while  the 
Sourceforge.net repository shows 13582 projects (out of 140k). Computer games that 
are developed in these communities range from role-playing games (the most popular 
category),  to  simulation  games,  MUD  (Multi  User  Dungeons)  games,  first  person 
shooters, arcades, to board/card/strategy games. Sourceforge’s activity rank shows that 
among the 100 most active projects 17 belong to the category “Games/Entertainment”. 
Almost 60% of the computer game projects that are present in SourceForce have end 
users  as  their  intended  audience,  the  remaining  ones  are  software  projects  such  as 
toolkits,  modeling,  rendering,  animation  engines,  frameworks  that  target  developers 
rather than final users. 
It  is  difficult to  sketch  the  development  cycle  for  the  typical  F/OS  computer  game 
project due to the highly heterogeneous nature of F/OS communities. In other words, 
there is a growing line of research that looks at F/OSS development not in mere terms of 
technical  enhancement  but,  rather,  as  a  complex  socio-technical  system  (Kuwabara, 
2000;  Lin,  2005a).  While  early  studies  have  convincingly  contrasted  F/OSS 
development  with  respect  to  closed  source  models,  in  doing  so  they  subsumed  the 
existence  of  “a  unified  community  with  shared  values,  motives,  and  development 
approaches”  (Tuomi,  2004).  Overall,  these  studies  have  failed  to  understand  the 
heterogeneous  and  contingent  nature  of  the  processes  of  F/OSS  deployment, 
development and implementation and of the contexts in which those processes occur. In   17 
this  line,  Lin  (2005)  suggests  to  interpret  F/OSS  under  the  lens  of  a  sociological 
perspective based on the social worlds theory (Strauss, 1978; Gerson, 1983). According 
to this approach, one has to focus on artifacts, actors and artifacts as the elementary unit 
of analysis for interpreting the complex nature  of the socio-technical processes that 
occur within F/OSS communities. 
De Paoli et al. (2006), in the line of Lin (2005) and Scacchi (2004), suggest that there 
are  several  artifacts  in  the  F/OSS  communities  that  have  the  “ability  of  connecting 
different social worlds and sustaining socio–technical interactions”.  In this line, Lin 
(2005b) claims that liberal licensing schemes acts as mechanisms involving interested 
participants (hackers from the F/OSS community and software corporations in the OSS 
industry) in the innovation process. In particular, the type of license (GPL vs. BSD-like) 
provides different incentives for the participation in the innovation process, according to 
the  specific  business  model  employed  by  the  firm. For  instance,  GPL-like  licences, 
contrarily to BSD-like licences, limit the incorporation in proprietary (closed source) 
projects of incremental and cumulative innovations made upon a given piece of code, 
thus deterring from the participation firms those business model place a strong emphasis 
on direct revenues schemes while attracting firms from complementary industries or 
with complementary business models.  
In this line De Paoli et al. (2006) claim that “Licenses specify the boundaries of the 
permission granted by the copyright owner to the user”. The authors contrast the static 
and homogeneous view of F/OSS communities as ideal free worlds as assumed by part 
of the existing literature, and provide evidence that the free/open identity is actually the 
result of negotiation between participants in everyday interactions and practices. For 
instance, the decision upon releasing the code according to a particular licensing scheme 
is interpreted as the result of the negotiation at the participants level upon the direction 
in which one wants the technology to go, the boundaries of the community to be set, and 
so forth. In this sense, difference licenses represent artifacts that structure activities and 
practices  through  the  imposition  of  different  political  and  technical  boundaries, 
affecting the participation of actors, how innovation is deployed and implemented, and 
so on. 
Despite the difficulties in deriving a clear cut model of the development process, it is 
still possible to describe, at a very general level, which processes and practices are very   18 
popular in F/OS computer game projects. In doing so, we will try to highlight the major 




FIGURE  3:  A  stylized  F/OSS  development  community  (Crowston  &  Howison, 
forthcoming). 
 
A typical project revolves around a community of “stakeholders” in which end-users’ 
and  developers’  roles  often  overlap.  The  social  structure  of  the  project  reminds  an 
onion-like  structure  (as  in  Figure  3),  in  which  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  between 
different roles and levels of involvement in the project. Central for the project are core 
developers, that contribute the largest part of the code for the project and that may take 
part in fundamental decision-making for the project, such as design of the architecture, 
division of the project in modules, and so on. External rings represent a more partial 
involvement in the development activities: co-developers, in this sense, provide smaller 
parts of code, such as patches and bug fixes, localization activities, or are distinguished 
by  more  episodic  contribution  of  larger  piece  of  code.  A  more  external  layer  is 
represented by active users that are involved in various feedback activities, such as 
testing and bug signaling. Most of the time within the project a fundamental role is 
played by the project leader, that in many cases is the initiator of the project, strongly 
involved in the development of the early releases of the software and that overtime turns 
much  of  his  efforts  in  more  general  activities  of  coordination  of  the  whole  project 
(fundamental design decision, involvement of other developers, peer review of the code, 
and so on).   19 
Typically, the contribution efforts in a single project are very skewed and centralized 
into a very small subset of participants (Krishnamurthy, 2002). This has been proved to 
be particularly true for fundamental activities (such as coding), suggesting the existing 
tension  regarding  the  preservation  of  the  conceptual  integrity  and  the  direction  of 
development of the project. The same is, on the contrary, less evident for less critical 
activities (such as bug tracking and fixing; Mockus et al. 2002), in which more man-
power is always welcomed. 
The  overall  picture  is  rather  distant  from  the  idea  of  a  “great  babbling  bazaar  of 
differing agendas and approaches […] out of which a coherent and stable system could 
seemingly emerge only by a succession of miracles” (Raymond, 1999); rather, most of 
the time contributions to the common project is highly monitored and peer-reviewed by 
various form of hierarchical control, in order to preserve, albeit within an overall highly 
decentralized development environment, the conceptual integrity of the whole project. 
 
Developing games in F/OSS communities: The Battle for Wesnoth case 
The Battle for Wesnoth (from now on, Wesnoth) is a cross-platform, fantasy-themed, 
turn-based strategy game, released under the GNU GPL license, allowing multi-player 
gaming over the Internet and with language support for over twenty different languages. 
The  computer  game,  developed  by  a  voluntary  and  distributed  community  of 
developers, has been labeled as the F/OS counterpart of the year 2005 best seller World 
of  Warcraft,  a  commercial  proprietary  Massively  Multiplayer  Online  Role  Playing 
Game (MMORPG) in which users have to pay for an individual license plus a monthly 
fee in order to access to the on-line multiplayer capabilities. According to Freshmeat.net 
statistics, Wesnoth ranks 22nd (2nd in the Game subcategory) for user ratings and 240th 
for popularity (over a population of over 40k registered projects).  
David White started to develop Wesnoth on July 2003 and, as it is often the case for 
many F/OSS projects, conceived the early prototype as a one–man project in order to 
roughly showcase the potential of the project. In his words: 
“Version 0.1 of Wesnoth was developed entirely by me, and it was ugly. It had awful 
graphics, and no sound or music at all. I think the best way to deal with the problem is 
to make an early version of the game which showcases the desired gameplay. Then, 
people with the appropriate skills who like the game will contribute. This worked out   20 
well with Wesnoth, anyhow, as I soon attracted a fine artist, Francisco Munoz, and once 
the graphics were decent, more people started wanting to help.”
2 
White, still the project leader nowadays, was able to rapidly involve other developers 
and an interested audience and the development process proceeded at a fast pace, thus 
reaching the first stable release (version 1.0) on October 2005.  
The development process is similar to what can be observed in many F/OS communities 
in the sense that the degree of involvement of developers vary across the various parts 
and tasks of the project, according to their relative importance. So, if one focus on the 
most critical activities of development of the project core, it is possible to observe a 
limited  number  of  core  developers  involved  and  a  typical  pattern  of  power-law 
distribution of contribution efforts. If one consider the project according to a broader 
perspective,  there  is,  on  the  one  side,  a  larger  group  of  co-developers  involved  in 
complementary activities such as bug–reporting or the development of small patches of 
code and, on the other side, a large involvement of a the user/developers community in 
the production non core and less critical modules, such as customizations and add-ons. 
Most of them, such as themes, campaigns, units, scenarios, and other art elements, are 
distributed under free/open source license and shared across the community using an 
on-line forum that acts as a meeting point for developers, contributors and mere game 
users. This feature seems to be very attractive and to explain in part the large popularity 
of the among computer game players, since it allows a direct involvement of user base 
in the development of the project. In particular, as put by the project leader “it does blur 
the line between 'developer created content' and 'user created content' and so […] makes 
it much easier for any user to contribute to the game”
3. 
In essence, the project is structured in a way to allow, both technically and according to 
its  licensing  terms,  modifications/customizations  ranging  from  mild  tailoring  to 
devising a totally new game scenario based on the same game engine (such as in the 
case of the project known as Spacenoth, that is based on a futuristic/sci-fi theme). 
Division of labor and coordination of efforts in achieved using an heterogeneous sets of 
instruments and strategies, balancing the need for preserving the conceptual integrity of 
                                                 
2 Excerpt from a Wikinews interview to David White, June 1, 2006, available at  
http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/In_the_land_of_the_open_source_elves:_Interview_with_"
Battle_for_Wesnoth"_creator_David_White. 
3 See the previous note.   21 
the  overall  project  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  need  to  exploit  man–power  and 
collaborative efforts by interested participants. First of all, the project leader choose to 
adopt  a  development  style  labeled  as  “evolutionary  programming”,  starting  from  a 
simple prototype and improving the code via incremental modifications, without having 
in mind a complete pre-planned design of the project. In doing so, a lot of effort has 
been placed in keep the project as simple as possible (avoiding more complex and up-
to-date design options) and replying as much as possible on loose–coupling principles, 
based on the modularity paradigm, as a way to effectively involve developers in the 
project, allowing for distributed, concurrent and independent development of specific 
parts  (arts,  core  engine,  network,  widgets,  and  so  on).  Moreover,  larger  degrees  of 
freedom in the project, such as access privileges to the CVS, has been granted overtime 
only  to  contributors  that  have  provided  a  credible  commitment  and  contributions 
aligned to the project aims. Despite these efforts, and given the imperfectly planned 
design of the project, the quasi-independent modules still allowed for the existence of a 
non marginal degree of interdependencies between different parts of the project, that 
was solved superimposing a significant share of “glue code”, largely developed by the 
project  leader,  and  intended  to  effectively  connecting  modules  and  solving  those 
interdependencies. 
Apart  from  loose  coupling  and  the  production  of  glue  code  by  the  project  leader, 
coordination of efforts is pursued also, on one side, via stardardization of activities and 
coding conventions, and on mutual adjustment enabled by the use of coordination tools 
that acts as mediating artifacts. 
With reference to the former topic, Wesnoth is written in C++ language, employing a 
minimal set of basic and low–level conventions regarding code writing and relying to 
the general KISS (Keep it Simple Stupid) principle, mandating simplicity over state-of-
the-art and/or complex design. It is worth to note that almost everything needed in the 
project  is  coded  from  scratch  without  the  support  of  toolkits,  frameworks  or  other 
middleware technologies. While this choice clearly introduces steep barriers to entry 
into the project core from interested, albeit not skilled enough users/developers, there is 
a clear exception that is represented by the existence of very simple toolkits easing non-
core contributions from technically inexperienced users in terms of new scenarios, add-
ons, campaigns, maps and such, through simple editors.   22 
Mutual  adjustment  is,  typically,  pursued  using  the  typical  coordination  and 
collaboration  tools  that  are  commonly  adopted  in  F/OSS  communities,  such  as  the 
forums, IRC channels, bug-tracking systems, to–do lists, (see for instance van Wendel 




As we have seen from the cases, describing the two development processes just in terms 
of different property rights on the software code produced can be misleading.  
A first useful dimension along which to compare the cases can be defined by the actors 
involved  in  the  two  instances  we  observed.  In  the  F/OSS  development  process  we, 
typically, have a good level of technical knowledge homogeneity between the actors 
involved,  be  they  core  developers,  content  providers,  or  more  peripheral  users. 
User/developers are, in fact, a characteristic feature of F/OSS development, as there is 
no equivalent in the proprietary domain. However, on the other hand, these actors are 
severely  limited  from  a  coordination  point  of  view,  being  seldom  co-located  and, 
usually, not sharing a clearly defined production plan. In the proprietary case, we find 
the  opposite  problems.  Here,  actors  involved  in  the  development  process  do  not, 
typically,  suffer  from  coordination  problems.  In  fact,  within  company  coordination 
problems are resolved by hierarchy, and inter-firm coordination problems are managed 
through a double mechanism of contracts and quality control interactions. However, in 
this case, knowledge quality and heterogeneity constitute the main the problems. On the 
one hand, users are not considered a meaningful source of feedback, as console games 
cannot, for all practical purposes, be updated, and, in any case, users lack the necessary 
technical expertise to directly contribute to the development process. On the other hand, 
even  the  actors  directly  involved  possess  highly  differentiated  competences,  strictly 
associated with the phase of the development process they specialize in. 
For  these  reasons,  on  a  second  level,  we  can  observe  the  emergence  of  two  pretty 
differentiated sets of tools that developers use in the two cases. In the F/OSS world 
artifacts working as coordination tools (such as IRC channels, CVSs, and the like) are 
prevalent, whereas, software tools used to directly produce other pieces of code are 
seldom employed. In the proprietary, console software development market, by contrast,   23 
artifacts bridging high-level, creative software pieces, usually produced by artists or 
storytellers with a very shallow programming experience and lower-level code that can 
be compiled on a given platform. The presence of these asymmetries in knowledge 
domains  that  characterize  the  different  actors  create  the  room  for  third  parties  to 
introduce  tools  that  end  up  reinforcing  the  asymmetries,  that  is,  if  a  developer, for 
whatever reason, stops making lower level software, it will, over time, lose that ability, 
either directly, that is, because of a lack of practice, or indirectly, that is losing tech 
savvy  personnel  currently  working  for  them,  or  failing  to  attract  competent 
programmers. In this second domain, in contrast with what typically happens in the 
F/OSS communities, even developers have a very limited say in the way development 
tools are reshaped and modified by others (typically the console manufacturer, for the 
“inner” layers of the software kit, and by the middleware producers for the outer layers 
that interface with the high level language developers typically produce.) In this regard 
we might add that middleware mediates between the console hardware producer and the 
end product software developer not merely from a technical standpoint. In fact, the 
ability to filter, select and scrutinize the middleware producers’ work is one of the main 
tools that the console producer has to indirectly influence the developer’s work. 
At this same level, by contrast, F/OS computer gaming communities can be interpreted 
as  an  archetypal  instance  of  user-driven  or  community  based  innovation  model,  in 
which final users are viewed as a fundamental driver in innovation generation processes 
(Mockus et al., 2002; von Hippel and Katz, 2002; Shah, 2005; Haefliger, 2006).  
To summarize, then, it is apparent that the interplay between, property rules on the final 
code, coordination needs, relative heterogeneity of actors’ knowledge domains, artifacts 
they  adopt  to,  in  turn  produce  other  artifacts  for  the  final  users,  is  very  complex. 
Moreover,  the  specific  combinations  of  solutions  to  this  array  of  problems  that 
characterize each of the development arenas we explored can help us better understand 
tendencies emerging at the network and power levels between individual actors (Johns, 
2006). The evidences we presented in this paper, although still very preliminary and 
essentially anecdotal,  might prove fruitful when trying to explain new trends emerging 
in  the  proprietary  software  development  world,  that,  apparently,  are  bent  towards 
capturing advantages recognized to the F/OSS development model, especially in terms 
of speed and depth of the feedback cycle (see, for instance Sony’s move towards the   24 
adoption of a GNU development kit for its generation VII new console (PlayStation 3) 
planned for release on November 2006. In addition it has adopted a variety of open 
development  tools:  COLLADA,  an  XLM-based  tool  for  3D  modelling;  PSGL,  a 
modified version of OpenGL ES 1.0 with extensions specifically aimed at the PS3).   25 
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